

**Online Appendix**

**to**

**“Elite Identity and Political Accountability:  
A Tale of Ten Islands”**

## Online Appendix A Online Mathematical Appendix

### Online Appendix A.1 Determination of Economic Rents

We now describe an economy resembling the Caribbean setting in which the ordering of economic rents in (1) holds, with  $h$  types being planters and  $\ell$  types being merchants.

There are a finite number of planters  $n_P$  and merchants  $n_M$ , as well as a citizenry/workforce which is a continuum with unit mass. All agents are risk neutral.

Plantation production uses labour inputs and exhibits constant returns to scale. Each worker hired produces output of  $\lambda > 0$  units of sugar. Sugar is entirely exported at the price prevailing on international markets, which we normalize to one. Planters collude in setting the wage  $w$  to maximize planter profits. In doing so, they are constrained by a worker's outside option of becoming a smallholder. This option is worth  $\tau(x)y$  to a worker, where  $y$  is determined by an independent draw from the distribution  $U(0, 1)$  and  $\tau(1) < \tau(0)$  so that the extractive policy makes each worker's outside option less attractive (and thereby depresses wages). In the Caribbean, reducing workers' outside options was the primary way in which wages could be reduced. One reason was because London abolitionists kept a watchful eye on labour practices on the plantations themselves. Another reason was that smallholding truly was the relevant alternative to plantation labour so that wages were set at that margin as opposed to the standard assumption of wages being set at the margin of labour productivities in two-wage paying sectors. See [Dippel, Greif, and Trefler \(2018\)](#).

The profits of planters and plantation workers are spent entirely on a good which is imported by merchants. Workers who exercise their outside option and become smallholders engage in subsistence production. They exit the formal economy and do not purchase goods from merchants. Merchants import the consumption good at cost  $c$  and sell the good at price  $p > c$ , which is the cost to non-merchants of importing the good.

Let us now solve for the equilibrium profits of planters and merchants. To preserve symmetry within each occupational class, we assume that (1) workers are evenly distributed among planters and (2) sales to planters and workers are evenly distributed among merchants.

A worker will accept a wage  $w$  if  $w > \tau(x)y$  or  $y < \frac{w}{\tau(x)}$ . Hence by paying a wage of  $w$ , each planter will hire mass  $\frac{w}{n_M \tau(x)}$  of workers. Thus a wage of  $w$  yields profit of

$$\pi_P(w; x) = \frac{w}{n_P \tau(x)} (\lambda - w).$$

When planters collude in setting  $w$  to maximize planter profits, the equilibrium wage is  $w^* = \lambda/2$  yielding equilibrium profit of

$$\pi_P(x) = \frac{\lambda^2}{4n_P \tau(x)}.$$

The equilibrium revenue of merchants is the sum of sales to planters and plantation workers, which is simply equal to total planter revenue (i.e., wages are transfers between planters and plantation workers), which equals  $\frac{\lambda^2}{2n_P \tau(x)}$ . Hence the profit to each merchant is

$$\pi_M(x) = \frac{1}{n_M} \frac{p - c}{p} \frac{\lambda^2}{2\tau(x)}.$$

As  $\tau(1) < \tau(0)$ ,  $\pi_P(1) > \pi_P(0)$  and  $\pi_M(1) > \pi_M(0)$ .

In addition, planters gain more from extractive policy than merchants, i.e.,  $\pi_P(1) - \pi_P(0) > \pi_M(1) - \pi_M(0)$ , if

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\lambda^2}{4n_P\tau(x)} \left[ \frac{1}{\tau(1)} - \frac{1}{\tau(0)} \right] &> \frac{1}{n_M} \frac{p-c}{p} \frac{\lambda^2}{2\tau(x)} \left[ \frac{1}{\tau(1)} - \frac{1}{\tau(0)} \right] \\
 \frac{1}{2} &> \frac{n_P}{n_M} \frac{p-c}{p} \\
 \frac{1}{2} \frac{n_M}{n_P} &> \frac{p-c}{p},
 \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

that is the merchants' markup must be sufficiently small relative to the share of merchants.

In sum, if (28) holds, then  $\pi_P(1) - \pi_P(0) > \pi_M(1) - \pi_M(0)$ , which is the condition we impose in the paper, with planters being  $h$  types and merchants  $\ell$  types.

## Online Appendix A.2 Elite Composition and Political Outcomes

**Proposition A1** Construct state  $z'$  from state  $z$  by switching  $\theta_i = L$  to  $H$  for  $n_1$  players and switching  $\omega_i$  to  $\ell$  for  $n_2$  players, for any feasible  $(n_1, n_2)$ .

The likelihood that extractive policy is passed is lower in state  $z'$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 | z) > \mathbb{P}(x_t = 1 | z').$$

**Proof of Proposition A1** Suppress time notation. In equilibrium, extractive policy is passed if and only if  $d^* \geq 0$ . Hence the likelihood that extractive policy is passed is  $\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0)$ .

Let  $\gamma(N, k)$  denote the set of  $k$ -subsets of  $N$ . Define

$$\Gamma(N, K) \equiv \bigcup_{k=K}^n \gamma(N, k),$$

with typical member  $A$ . Then

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0) = \sum_{A \in \Gamma(N, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil)} \prod_{j \in A} \mathbb{P}(D_j \geq 0) \prod_{j' \notin A} \mathbb{P}(D_{j'} < 0). \tag{29}$$

Note that the following statements are equivalent:

$$\begin{aligned}
 D_j &\geq 0 \\
 \pi_j - \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} (\bar{p} - P_j) (\pi_j + r) &\geq 0 \\
 \bar{p} - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{\pi_j}{\pi_j + r} &\leq P_j.
 \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

Define

$$\Delta_j \equiv \bar{p} - \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{\pi_j}{\pi_j + r}, \tag{31}$$

which is less than  $\bar{p}$  and positive due to Assumption 2. Hence  $\mathbb{P}(D_j \geq 0) = 1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \in (0, 1)$ . (29) can then be reexpressed as

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0) = \sum_{A \in \Gamma(N, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil)} \prod_{j \in A} [1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)] \prod_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \quad (32)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \sum_{A \in \Gamma(N - \{i\}, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil - 1)} [1 - F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i)] \prod_{j \in A} [1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)] \prod_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \\ &\quad + \sum_{A' \in \Gamma(N - \{i\}, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil)} F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) \prod_{j \in A'} [1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)] \prod_{j \in N-A'} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= -F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) \sum_{A \in \Gamma(N - \{i\}, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil - 1)} \prod_{j \in A} [1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)] \prod_{j \in N-A} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j) \\ &\quad + \sum_{A' \in \Gamma(N - \{i\}, \lceil \frac{1}{2}n \rceil - 1)} \prod_{j \in A'} [1 - F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j)] \prod_{j \in N-A'} F_{\theta_j}(\Delta_j). \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

Now replace  $i$  with  $i'$  such that  $\theta_i = L$ ,  $\theta_{i'} = H$  and  $\omega_i = \omega_{i'}$  as hypothesized. By (34), the difference in probabilities is

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \theta_i = L) - \mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \theta_{i'} = H) \propto F_L(\Delta_i) - F_H(\Delta_{i'}). \quad (35)$$

As  $\omega_i = \omega_{i'}$ ,  $\Delta_i = \Delta_{i'}$ . In addition,  $F_H(\Delta) > F_L(\Delta)$  for all  $\Delta \in (0, \bar{p})$  by assumption. Hence (35) is negative.

Similarly replacing  $i$  with  $i'$  such that  $\omega_i = h$ ,  $\omega_{i'} = \ell$  and  $\theta_i = \theta_{i'}$  as hypothesized yields

$$\mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \omega_i = \ell) - \mathbb{P}(D^* \geq 0 | \omega_{i'} = h) \propto F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_i) - F_{\theta_i}(\Delta_{i'}). \quad (36)$$

$\Delta_{i'} > \Delta_i$ , because  $\pi(1, h) > \pi(1, \ell)$ . Hence (36) is negative as  $F$  is strictly increasing.

Iterating this procedure establishes the proposition.  $\square$

## Online Appendix B Measuring Legislator Types

The secondary sources that we consulted were, for each island separately:

1. for Jamaica: [Heuman \(1981\)](#) and [Holt \(1991\)](#)
2. for Antigua: [Oliver \(1896\)](#), [Lowes \(1994\)](#), [Lowes \(1995\)](#), [Dyde \(2000\)](#) and [Lightfoot \(2007\)](#)
3. for Barbados: [Schomburgk \(1848\)](#), [Hoyos \(1978\)](#) and [Beckles \(2006\)](#)
4. for Dominica: [Trouillot \(1988\)](#), [Honychurch \(1984\)](#) and [Baker \(1994\)](#)
5. for Grenada: [Brizan \(1984\)](#) and [Cox \(2007\)](#)
6. for Montserrat: [Davy \(1854\)](#), [Fergus \(1994\)](#), and [Berleant-Schiller \(1995\)](#)
7. for St. Kitts: [Britain \(1840, p.94-96\)](#), [Hall \(1971\)](#) and [Dyde \(2005\)](#)
8. for Nevis: [Iles \(1871\)](#), [Hall \(1971\)](#) and [Olwig \(2005\)](#)
9. for St. Vincent: [Sheppard \(1831\)](#), [West Indies Royal Commission \(1884, p.101-126\)](#), [Smith \(2009\)](#) and [Smith and Forster \(2013\)](#)
10. for Tobago: [Craig-James \(2000\)](#)

Elite members' racial identity was primarily determined based on the above sources, as well as on whether a family was listed in the 1820s *Slave Registries*, or in the *Emancipation Compensation Tables* in 1835. For the new elite planters emerging in the post-Emancipation period, we perused the distinct island-specific plantation surveys in [Online Appendix Table 1](#).

To assign each legislator one of the four group labels, our starting point were plantation ownership records. Before emancipation, all planters were white. In a first step, we therefore coded legislators that belonged to families that were pre-Emancipation plantation owners as 'white planters.' Before Emancipation, plantation owners were recorded in the *Slave Registries* in the 1820s and then again in the *Emancipation Compensation Tables* in 1835.<sup>45</sup> Most families that appeared in the assemblies before 1838 were also recorded as plantation owners, but if they were not we coded them as white merchants. For legislators whose families first appeared after Emancipation we consulted post-Emancipation plantation surveys to establish if they were planters or merchants, and we consulted an extensive list of island-specific social and political histories to establish whether they were white or not. Given the salience of race as a feature of Caribbean history, these island-specific accounts are usually quite explicit in this regard. The historical accounts almost never contradicted the coding based on pre-Emancipation plantation ownership records, except in rare cases of shared last names. They were essential for establishing the social type of legislators whose families' names had not appeared anywhere before Emancipation, particularly because there was a substantial number of white planters in the data that first appeared after Emancipation, apparently mostly 'estate attorneys' that managed the plantations of older established planter families.

Despite the wealth of information we collected, we still had to make some judgement calls on some individuals in islands where the social histories and records were less extensive and detailed

<sup>45</sup> From 1813 on, the Crown required colonies to register all slaves. Most colonies have three iterations of the *slave registries*, but each new iteration simply updated the previous for births and deaths. When England abolished slavery, it set aside money to compensate slave owners for their loss. The disbursement of that money was recorded in the *Compensation Tables*. We digitized the *Slave Registries* ourselves, while the *Compensation Tables* data had been digitized by a research project at University College London; all 30,308 claimants can be viewed on consecutive url's running from <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/claim/view/1> to [.../30308](http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/claim/view/30308).

than in Jamaica. Importantly, however, the thrust of our empirical analysis, especially on the key predictions on roll-call voting behavior, is based on Jamaican data. Jamaica, being the biggest and most important of the islands, had the richest records so that there was no ambiguity in measuring elite types.

Table Online Appendix Table 1: Data Sources for Plantation Surveys

Antigua	1817	Slave Registries - Antigua	Montserrat	1835	Compensation Tables
Antigua	1829	Johnson (1830), A Descriptive Account of Antigua	Montserrat	1848	House of Commons Papers 1847-48 (399), p.116-118 <sup>e</sup>
Antigua	1835	Compensation Tables	Montserrat	1858	House of Commons Papers 1857-58 [2403], p.99-101 <sup>c</sup>
Antigua	1843	Hart, the 1843 Antigua Almanac & Registry	Nevis	1817	Slave Registries
Antigua	1851	The 1852 Antigua Almanac	Nevis	1835	Compensation Tables
Antigua	1858	House of Commons Papers 1857-58 [2403], p.74-77 <sup>c</sup>	Nevis	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac
Antigua	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac	Nevis	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.229-232 <sup>b</sup>
Antigua	1891	Hall (1971), Five of the Leewards, Appendix A	St. Lucia	1852	The 1852 St. Lucia Almanac
Barbados	1817	Slave Registries - Barbados	St. Lucia	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.56-57 <sup>b</sup>
Barbados	1835	Compensation Tables	St. Kitts	1835	Compensation Tables
Barbados	1848	Barbados Almanac for 1848	St. Kitts	1847	House of Commons Papers 1847-48 (245), p.121-124 <sup>d</sup>
Barbados	1854	Barbados Almanac for 1854	St. Kitts	1850	The 1850 St. Christophers Almanac
Barbados	1861	Barbados Almanac for 1861	St. Kitts	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac
Barbados	1865	Barbados Almanac for 1865	St. Kitts	1897	House of Commons Papers 1898 [C.8669], p.229-232 <sup>b</sup>
Barbados	1870	Barbados Almanac for 1870	St. Vincent	1817	Slave Registries - St. Vincent
Barbados	1898	Barbados Almanac for 1898	St. Vincent	1827	Shephard (1831), Historical Account of St. Vincent, T.6
Dominica	1817	Slave Registries - Dominica	St. Vincent	1831	Slave Registries - St. Vincent
Dominica	1835	Compensation Tables	St. Vincent	1835	Compensation Tables
Dominica	1878	The 1879 Leeward Islands Almanac	Tobago	1819	Slave Registries - Tobago
Grenada	1817	Slave Registries - Grenada	Tobago	1832	Woodcock (1867), A History of Tobago, Appendix
Grenada	1835	Compensation Tables	Tobago	1835	Compensation Tables
Grenada	1849	House of Commons Papers 1849 [1126], p.180-181 <sup>g</sup>	Tobago	1847	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.32-33 <sup>a</sup>
Grenada	1867	The 1867 Grenada Almanac	Tobago	1862	Woodcock (1867), A History of Tobago, Appendix
Guyana	1833	House of Commons Papers 1833 (700), p.4-11 <sup>f</sup>	Tobago	1881	Craig-James (2008), Tables 5.9-5.11
Guyana	1838	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.94-98 <sup>a</sup>	Tobago	1894	The Trinidad Almanac 1894
Guyana	1846	House of Commons Papers 1847 [869], p.94-98 <sup>a</sup>	Trinidad	1813	Slave Registries - Trinidad
Guyana	1860	The Guyana Almanac 1860	Trinidad	1835	Compensation Tables
Guyana	1879	The Guyana Almanac 1879	Trinidad	1882	The Trinidad Almanac 1882
Jamaica	1829	The 1829 Jamaica Almanac	Trinidad	1888	The Trinidad Almanac 1888
Jamaica	1835	Compensation Tables	Trinidad	1894	The Trinidad Almanac 1894
Jamaica	1840	The 1840 Jamaica Almanac			

Notes: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers: (a) "1847 [869] The reports made for the year 1846 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1846." (b) "1898 [C.8669] West India Royal commission. Report of the West India Royal commission. Appendix C., vol. III, containing parts VI. to XIII. Proceedings, evidence, and documents relating to the Windward Islands, the Leeward Islands, and Jamaica." (c) "1857-58 [2403] The reports made for the year 1856 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1856." (d) "1847-48 (245) Seventh report from the Select Committee on Sugar and Coffee Planting; together with the minutes of evidence, and appendix." (e) "1847-48 (399) West India colonies and Mauritius. Returns to two addresses of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated respectively 8 & 31 May 1848." (f) "1833 (700) Slave population. (Slave registries.) Return to an address to His Majesty, dated 29 July 1833." (g) "1849 [1126] The reports made for the year 1848 to the Secretary of State having the Department of the Colonies. Transmitted with the blue books for the year 1848."

Table Online Appendix Table 2: The Parishes in the Ten Islands

<u><i>Jamaica</i></u>	<u><i>Antigua</i></u>	<u><i>Barbados</i></u>	<u><i>St. Kitts</i></u>
Clarendon	Belfast	Bridgetown	Anguilla
Hanover	Dickensons Bay	Christ Church	Christ Church
Kingston	Five Islands	St Andrew	St Anne
Manchester	New North Sound	St George	St George
Metcalfe	Nonsuch	St James	St John Capisterre
Port Royal	Old North Sound	St John	St Mary
Portland	Old Road	St Joseph	St Paul
St Andrew	Popeshead	St Lucy	St Peter
St Anne	Rendezvous Bay	St Michael	St Thomas
St Catherine	St John	St Peter	Trinity
St David	Town of St John	St Philip	
St Dorothy	Willoughby Bay	St Thomas	<u><i>Tobago</i></u>
St Elizabeth	Town of Parham		
St George	Towns of Falmouth	<u><i>Montserrat</i></u>	St Andrew
St James	& English Harbor		St David
St John		St George	St George
St Mary	<u><i>Dominica</i></u>	St Patrick	St John
St Thomas East		St Peter	St Mary
St Thomas in Vale	St Andrew	Plymouth & Kinsale	St Patrick
Trelawny	St David	St Anthony	St Paul
Vere	St George		Town of Plymouth
Westmoreland	St John	<u><i>St. Vincent</i></u>	Town of Scarborough
	St Joseph		
<u><i>Nevis</i></u>	St Luke	Charlotte	<u><i>Grenada</i></u>
	St Mark	Grenadines	
St George	St Patrick	Kingstown	Carriacou
St James	St Paul	St Andrew	St Andrew & St David
St John	St Peter	St David	St George & St John
St Paul	Town of Portsmouth	St George	St Mark & St Patrick
St Thomas	Town of Roseau	St Patrick	

Notes: This table simply lists the the islands' parishes, i.e. the electoral districts returning assemblymen.



Table Online Appendix Table 3: Re-Estimating Table 2 with District Fixed Effects

Panel A. *Voting Overlap* with the White Planters: Jamaica

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ℓ(New Elite)	-5.176*** [0.001]	-6.306*** [0.000]	-5.370*** [0.006]	-6.358*** [0.001]				
ℓ(New Elite Planter)					-1.689 [0.428]	-2.850 [0.184]	-2.287 [0.405]	-3.558 [0.198]
ℓ(New Elite Merchant)					-6.987*** [0.000]	-8.069*** [0.000]	-6.762*** [0.006]	-7.581*** [0.002]
weighted year FE		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Observations	999	999	999	999	999	999	999	999
R-squared	0.153	0.249	0.255	0.340	0.159	0.255	0.259	0.343

Panel B. *Voting Overlap* with the White Planters: Barbados & Grenada

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ℓ(New Elite)	-3.016 [0.151]	-2.650* [0.053]			-3.514** [0.019]	-3.329** [0.039]		
ℓ(New Elite Planter)			-3.040 [0.137]	-1.654 [0.359]			-2.629 [0.116]	-2.446 [0.151]
ℓ(New Elite Merchant)			-3.000 [0.339]	-3.262* [0.067]			-4.016** [0.023]	-4.025** [0.041]
island:	Barbados				Grenada			
year FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Observations	1,064	1,064	1,064	1,064	733	733	733	733
R-squared	0.039	0.185	0.039	0.185	0.041	0.130	0.042	0.131

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 with district fixed effects added, resulting in a larger R squared and somewhat smaller point estimates on the coefficient of interest. *p-values* for standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in square brackets, \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance.

## Online Appendix C Barbados's Geography

Barbados was an outlier among the Caribbean slave societies in its geography. While all Caribbean islands shared their climatic conditions, there was large variation in geographic characteristics like elevation and soil. The typical Caribbean sugar colony was characterized by sugar-suitable coastal plains and a rugged interior that lay fallow during slavery. Barbados was the only Caribbean sugar island that combined the advantages of limestone rather than volcanic soil with a high enough elevation to protect sugar from saltwater and storm surges. The Caribbean is divided into three island chains: The Greater Antilles are large islands with mountainous interiors and coastal plains. Of these, only Jamaica was a British colony, the others are Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Most British Caribbean colonies—Dominica, the British Virgin Islands, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—belonged to the inner chain of the Lesser Antilles, which is volcanic and mountainous. The outer chain of Lesser Antilles—Anguilla, Bahamas, Barbados, Turks and Caicos—consists of flat limestone. This limestone was more suitable for sugar cultivation because it retained water better than the volcanic land on the inner chain (Richardson, 1997, p. 147) and because sugar does not like high elevations. In Barbados, the *entire* land area was highly sugar-suitable land, and over 95% of its land was under cultivation on the eve of emancipation, compared to under 50% elsewhere in the Caribbean (Martin, 1839, p.32–102). While Barbados was not particularly unique during slavery, it was unique *after* emancipation its ability to offer extremely low wages for lack of any other options to the citizenry. Consequently, a merchant class catering to local markets did not develop, and emancipated blacks did not obtain the franchise for a lack of available land for purchase.

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